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Abstract 
We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive 
debt contracts.  These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower's 
performance deteriorates or improves, thereby increasing expected costs of financial distress 
while also making a firm riskier to the benefit of option holders.  We find that managers whose 
compensation is more sensitive to stock price volatility choose steeper and more convex 
performance pricing schedules, while those with high delta incentives choose flatter, less convex 
pricing schedules.  Performance pricing contracts therefore seem to provide a channel for 
managers to increase firms’ financial risk to gain private benefits. 
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Negative Hedging: 
Performance Sensitive Debt and CEOs’ Equity Incentives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Performance pricing in commercial debt contracts links the borrower’s interest payments 
to a measure of financial performance, such as its current credit rating or certain balance sheet 
ratios.  A typical performance sensitive debt (PSD) contract charges lower interest rates in times 
of good performance and higher interest during poor performance. 
Some practitioners caution that performance pricing may exacerbate the costs of financial 
distress.1  Consistent with these concerns, Manso, Strulovici and Tchistyi (2006) demonstrate 
that in a setting with bankruptcy costs and tax benefits, PSD obligations are less efficient than 
fixed-rate loans of the same market value, because PSD contracts precipitate default, increase 
bankruptcy costs and reduce the firm's value.  Moreover, the inefficiency of PSD is greater when 
the slope of performance pricing is steeper.   
This finding suggests that the existence of PSD obligations should be explained by other 
market frictions, and recent research has illuminated some possibilities.  Manso et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that PSD can be used as a signaling or screening device in a setting with asymmetric 
information.  Tchistyi (2006) shows that it is optimal to issue PSD in a dynamic setting with 
                                                 
1 For example, see "Credit ratings can harm your wealth," Investment Adviser, December 9, 2002. 
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moral hazard.  Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) suggest that PSD can reduce contracting costs.  
In this paper we develop and test a further theory, that PSD contracts enable executives to 
transfer value to themselves at the expense of shareholders.  In particular, our paper tests whether 
the existence and strength of PSD contract terms are related to managers’ incentives from 
ownership and compensation. 
Performance pricing increases the volatility of the firm's net earnings and, consequently, 
the volatility of equity returns.  This creates a potential conflict of interest between the firm's 
managers and shareholders, in which managers may enter into debt contracts that reduce share 
values.  This could occur because higher stock volatility due to performance pricing increases the 
value of stock options held by management, but it also may reduce the value of the firm because 
of higher expected costs of financial distress.  As a result, equity value could decline, if we 
assume that banks that agree to performance sensitive loans negotiate pricing schedules leaving 
them no worse off than the alternative of issuing fixed rate debt.  We illustrate this conflict of 
interest, which we call “negative hedging” by the manager, with a simple model in section 2 
below. 
To study whether managers with option and stock holdings exhibit systematic 
preferences for performance sensitive debt, we merge a large sample of commercial bank debt 
contracts with data about the equity ownership of the borrowing firms’ CEOs.  For each CEO in 
our sample, we calculate the delta, or sensitivity of stock and option values to changes in stock 
price, as well as the vega, or sensitivity of option values to changes in stock volatility.  We 
hypothesize that managers with significant vega incentives from option holdings are likely to 
choose debt with a PSD feature and, within the subset of PSD contracts, should prefer steeper 
performance pricing schedules, since steep pricing schedules imply rapid appreciation of their 
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option holdings when risk increases.  Conversely, managers with higher deltas from stock and 
options are likely to disfavor PSD contracts and, when PSD is used, to prefer arrangements with 
flatter slopes, because these managers should be more concerned about their exposure to the 
higher expected distress costs associated with PSD contracts. 
Although PSD is not the only risk-shifting device managers can use to increase the value 
of their stock options, its relative lack of transparency makes it attractive for this purpose.  PSD 
is widely issued, but its incentive effects are more complex than those of straight or convertible 
debt and it is difficult to value.2  More visible strategies for risk-shifting, such as undertaking 
risky investment projects or adding leverage to the capital structure, are easy for investors to 
observe and are often restricted by covenants on existing debt.  
The results of our analysis, based upon Tobit regression estimations, support these 
hypotheses.  Using a sample of several thousand loan contracts negotiated by 1,239 U.S. 
companies from 1994 to 2002, we find that firms whose CEOs exhibit high deltas from their 
stock and option holdings tend to have flatter performance pricing schedules; one standard 
deviation increase from the mean in delta corresponds to a 42 percent decrease in the slope of the 
performance pricing schedule.  Conversely, we find that CEO’s with high vegas from option 
inventories tend to have steeper performance pricing schedules: After controlling for 
heterogeneity in borrowers' characteristics and loan characteristics, a one standard deviation 
increase from the mean of log (1+vega) corresponds to a 17 percent increase in the performance 
pricing schedule’s slope. 
We examine the relation between CEOs’ incentives and the PSD slope more closely in 
two different ways.  We look at the “interest increasing” and “interest decreasing” segments of 
                                                 
2 Stanford finance professor Darrell Duffie has stated in the news media that PSD contracts “have caused some 
head-scratching in terms of how to price them,” The New York Times, January 29, 2002.  
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the PSD slope, those that lie at credit ratings below and above the firm’s rating at the time of 
contracting.  We find a stronger relation between CEOs’ delta incentives and the interest 
increasing slope, implying that CEOs with high ownership are more concerned with avoiding 
expected costs of financial distress than with reaping the benefits of high rewards for 
performance improvements.  We also examine the convexity, rather than the slope, of the PSD 
pricing schedule, and we find that both local and overall convexity are positively associated with 
CEOs’ vega incentives and negatively related to their delta incentives. 
We also explore whether borrowers with high monitoring needs negotiate more refined 
PSD schedules, with a large number of gradations included the pricing schedule to reflect 
possible changes in borrowers’ credit quality.  Consistent with this monitoring hypothesis, we 
find that firms whose CEOs have high vegas from their option holdings exhibit PSD contracts 
with larger numbers of steps in the contract pricing grid. 
Despite PSD’s growing importance, our knowledge of its role in corporate lending is 
limited.  Our study is similar in design to the most comprehensive empirical study of PSD to date, 
Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005).  That paper uses 8,761 bank loans from the Loan Pricing 
Corp. (LPC) Dealscan database and partitions the PSD contracts into two groups: interest 
decreasing loans, in which low-credit borrowers negotiate a schedule of interest reductions 
contingent upon improved performance, and interest increasing loans, which stipulate rising 
interest rates should a high-credit borrower’s performance deteriorate.  The authors conjecture 
that different economic motives lead to these different forms of PSD and verify their hypotheses 
using a variety of variables related to historical default rates, return volatilities, and measures of 
credit rating precision and information asymmetry.  Other studies of PSD include Beatty and 
Weber (2003), Hillion and Vermaelen (2004), Lando and Mortensen (2005), and working papers 
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by Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2006), and Tchystyi (2006).  A related paper by Bhanot and 
Mello (2006) presents a theoretical model of debt contracts with rating triggers; these triggers 
can force either early payment of debt or increases in coupon rates when a firm’s rating is 
lowered.  The authors conclude that repayment triggers can be used to mitigate agency costs due 
to asset substitution, but that coupon rate triggers – which resemble the PSD contracts studied in 
our paper – do not help solve the asset substitution problem.  Therefore we do not investigate a 
connection between PSD contracts and asset substitution. 
Our findings contribute to a literature showing that managers’ incentives from 
compensation and ownership can lead to risk-shifting behavior, redistributing value from among 
financial claim holders while potentially reducing the overall value of the firm.  Important papers 
in this area include Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990), Parrino 
and Weisbach (1999), Cohen, Hall, and Viciera (2000), Jin (2002), and Knopf, Nam, and 
Thornton (2002). 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents our hypotheses.  Section 3 presents 
institutional facts about PSD contracts and describes the data.  Section 4 contains the basic 
analysis of the effects of managers’ deltas and vegas upon the terms of PSD contracts.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Hypothesis development 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe a firm as a set of contacts.  According to this view, 
managers' interests differ from those of shareholders, requiring contracts that provide mangers 
with incentives to maximize shareholders’ wealth.  This argument provides a rationale for the 
widespread use of stock options in executive compensation.  However, under some 
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circumstances option compensation may fail to align the interests of managers and shareholders.  
For example, option compensation has been linked to the incidence of accounting fraud at firms 
in the late 1990s (Burns and Kedia, 2006) and has been subjected to manipulations that permitted 
managers to adjust timing of awards for personal enrichment (Heron and Lie, 2007). 
Following the set-of-contracts theory of the firm, a theoretical study by Tchistyi (2006) 
demonstrates that PSD is an optimal contract in a setting in which a manager can divert the 
firm’s cash flows for private consumption at the expense of outside investors.  PSD’s higher 
interest rates associated with poor performance provide incentives for the manager not to steal 
the firm’s cash flows.  Manso et al. (2006) show that PSD can serve as a signaling or screening 
device in a setting with asymmetric information.  In the equilibrium, a manager who is optimistic 
about the future of her firm prefers PSD, while a pessimistic manager prefers straight debt.  
Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) suggest that PSD can reduce contracting and renegotiation 
costs, since PSD automatically adjust its interest rate according to the firm’s performance. 
In this paper, we investigate whether PSD contracts also enable CEOs to transfer value to 
themselves at the expense of shareholders due to the presence of stock options in CEOs’ 
compensation packages. PSD reduces interest payments in states of good performance and 
increases interest payments in states of poor performance.  These contractual adjustments result 
in higher equity payoffs in good states and lower equity payoffs in bad states.  Because of the 
convexity of the option payoff, this tradeoff benefits option values. 
Consider a firm that takes a performance-sensitive loan of amount D at time t = 0.  The 
firm must pay back (1 + r(v))D at time t = 1.  The performance-sensitive yield r(v) is a function 
of the firm’s value v at t = 1. For simplicity, we assume the firm is liquidated at t = 1, there is no 
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bankruptcy cost, and v is distributed according to p.d.f. f(v) under a risk-neural probability 
measure.  Then, the payoff on the debt at t = 1 is given by min((1 + r(v))D, v).   
Assuming that the banking industry is competitive, the debt is issued at its fair market 
value:  
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It is clear from (2) that the value of the option package changes when the performance 
pricing changes: the lower the interest rate r(v) when the options finish in-the-money, the higher 
the value of the options.  Let r(v) be bounded from below by r0 = rf. Assuming that the amount of 
debt is not extremely high: 
( )0
0
(1 )
00 (1 )
1
( ) 1 ( )
(1 )
NK r D
NK r D
f
D vf v dv r Df v dv
r
+ + ¥
+ +
é ù£ + +ê úë û+ ò ò ,   (3) 
the option value is maximized by any of the following performance-pricing profiles:  
0
1
0
0
(1 )
( ),
* ( )
(1 )
,
v r D
r v if K
Nr v
v r D
r if K
N
- +ì £ïï= í - +ï >
ïî
,                                                                             (4) 
 8
where r1(v) = r0 is such that the market value of the debt with the performance-pricing profile r* 
at time zero is exactly D: 
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Performance pricing is a tradeoff between lower interest rates in good states and higher 
interest rates in bad states.  According to (4) and (5), this tradeoff is extreme for the 
performance-pricing profiles maximizing the value of the CEO’s options: the lowest possible 
interest rate is charged whenever the options finish in-the-money ( 0
(1 )v r D
K
N
- +
> ), and 
substantially higher interest rates are charged whenever the options finish out-of-the-money 
( 0
(1 )v r D
K
N
- +
£ ).  Figure 1 compares performance pricing profile r* that maximizes the value 
of an option with a typical performance pricing profile in our sample.  Because the tradeoff 
between lower rates in good states and higher rates in bad states is more pronounced for r*, the 
slope and the convexity are also greater for r*. 
According to our analysis, performance pricing profiles with steeper slopes and higher 
degrees of convexity result in higher option values because they exacerbate the riskiness of the 
manager’s option claim.  This leads us to the hypothesis that CEOs with large vega incentives 
from their option holdings are likely to choose steeper and more convex performance pricing 
schemes.  Vega, the derivative of option value with respect to stock volatility, is defined more 
completely below. 
Our second hypothesis is based on the finding by Manso et al. (2006) that PSD 
obligations are less efficient than fixed-rate loans of the same market value.  In particular, PSD 
obligations precipitate default, increase bankruptcy costs and reduce the firm's value and equity 
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value, based on an assumption that the value of debt does not decrease since the bank issuing a 
PSD loan makes sure that it does at least as well as if it had made a fixed rate loan.  Moreover, 
the inefficiency of PSD is greater when the slope of performance pricing is steeper.  Hence, we 
hypothesize that managers with higher delta prefer PSD contracts with flatter slopes.  Delta, the 
derivative of stock and option value with respect to stock price, is also defined more completely 
below. 
 
3.  Data description 
We obtain data about PSD contracts from the LPC Dealscan database, which contains 
detailed information on more than 100,000 loans, high-yield bonds, and private placements 
mostly to larger borrowers.  From 1994 to the present, Dealscan reports information about PSD 
features when they appear in debt contracts, including the PSD pricing grid.  A pricing grid is 
essentially a step function schedule of interest payments contingent upon some aspect of the 
borrower's future performance or financial health, such as its debt rating.  The Appendix 
provides illustrations of typical performance pricing contracts negotiated by one company. 
According to Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005), Dealscan reports five major types of 
financial measures found among the universe of PSD constracts: debt-to-EBITDA ratio (used in 
53.3% of contracts), debt ratings (24.9%), interest coverage ratio (8.4%), fixed charge ratio 
(4.8%), and leverage (8.6%).  Among these possible variables, we exmine those using the senior 
debt rating as a measure of a borrower's performance.3  This choice allows us to compare 
performance spreads across firms at different times.  Also, the senior debt rating may be subject 
to less manipulation by managers than other PSD criteria.  Beatty and Weber (2003) show that 
                                                 
3 PSD contracts based upon credit rating generally use the higher of the senior debt ratings maintained by Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s for the issuing company at any given time.  Pricing grids for these contracts are generally 
expressed using the S&P notation (e.g., BBB instead of Baa). 
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managers with PSD contracts tend to influence accounting information when performance 
measures are directly based on accounting figures.  To achieve standardization of contract 
formats within the subsample we study, we narrow our observations to contracts issued between 
1994 and 2002, by companies outside the financial industry (SIC codes 60-69), with LIBOR-
based spreads, and without multiple performance criteria. 
The riskiness of a PSD contract is measured by the slope of its performance pricing 
schedule.  A steep slope indicates low interest payments when a firm performs well and high 
interest payments when a firm performs poorly.  A flat slope, in contrast, indicates an ordinary 
fixed-rate debt contract where constant interest payments are charged regardless of how a firm 
performs.  Measuring the slope is complicated by the possibility that it might change over 
different ranges of the performance measure; the example presented in the Appendix shows 
exactly this situation, for a company whose pricing schedule is flatter at extreme levels of 
performance than in the middle range. 
We adopt two measures of the slope of a PSD contract, the “average slope” and the “local 
slope.”  To calculate average slope, we find the change in interest rates over each credit rating 
increment specified in a given PSD contract.  We then divide each incremental change by the 
market-wide difference in yields over the same increment at the time the contract was negotiated, 
using corporate bond yield data obtained from Moody’s.4  Under this scaling, a contract will 
exhibit a slope of 1 if it calls for a change in interest rates mirroring the profile of prevailing 
market yields.  The slope will exceed 1 if it is steeper than the market yield profile and will be 
less than 1 if it is flatter.  Fixed rate debt will have a slope of zero.  After calculating market-
adjusted slopes for all rating increments individually, we take their average value for each 
                                                 
4 Our market-wide data are based upon the Moody’s end-of-month value weighted average yield for long-term 
corporate bonds in each ratings class, according to data from the Citigroup YieldBook.  We thank Chenyang Wei for 
assistance in obtaining this data. 
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contract, over the range bounded by the upper and lower limits of credit ratings for which 
interest changes are specified (these upper and lower limits vary from one contract to another). 
Our calculation of local slope is quite similar.  Again we calculate the change in interest 
rates called for by the PSD contract over each rating increment and scale that change by the 
prevailing market-wide slope for each increment.  While the average slope calculation uses data 
for all increments specified under the contract, local slope is calculated as the average over the 
rating increments immediately above and immediately below the company’s rating at the time of 
contract negotiation.  Local slope is therefore: 
÷÷
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=
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where Spread(n) is the firm’s interest cost above LIBOR at any rating n, Moody (n) is the market 
value-weighted average yield within rating class n, and i is the firm’s rating at the time of 
contract negotiation.  About 20 percent of our PSD contracts (281 observations out of 1,375) are 
written with the company’s current credit rating as a “corner point” of the pricing schedule – 
meaning the changes in interest rates are specified only in one direction, exclusively above or 
exclusively below its current rating.  For these observations we calculate local slope using only 
the single rating increment adjacent to its current rating.  Figure 2 provides a graphical 
illustration of the calculation of local slope; intuitively, the slope of a PSD contract equals the 
change in spread (basis points above LIBOR) for each unit change in market spread at the firm’s 
current credit rating. 
To measure the convexity of a performance pricing profile r, we let lCR  and hCR  denote 
the lowest and the highest credit ratings used in the performance pricing schedule and N(CR) 
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denote the number of credit rating notches between CR and hCR .  We define the linear 
extrapolation of performance pricing schedule r as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
.l hL h
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r CR r CR N CR
N CR
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= +           (7) 
We define the convexity of performance pricing profile r as the greatest deviation from the linear 
extrapolation: 
 )()(rmax))()(r( L],[L CRrCRCRrCRsignx lh CRCRCRr -×-= Î .      (8) 
where )(asign is 1 if 0³a  and is -1 if 0<a .  Figure 2 shows conceptually how we measure 
convexity.  The large majority of our PSD contracts exhibit convexity according to this 
definition, although many contracts have inflection points between convex and concave 
segments, and our definition classifies a minority of 120 observations, or about 9 percent of our 
PSD sample, as concave.  In our calculations of convexity we assign negative values to the 
concave observations, so that concavity is essentially treated as “negative convexity.”  We 
calculate values of overall convexity and local convexity based upon the same approach as used 
for average slope and local slope. 
We merge our sample of debt contracts from Dealscan with borrowers’ financial 
statement data from Compustat using a matching algorithm.5  We gather variables measuring 
firm size (natural log of total assets), leverage (short-term plus long-term debt over total assets), 
market-to-book ratio, cash flow (EBITDA), and the time series volatility of cash flow (the 
standard deviation of EBITDA over the four years prior to the loan year, standardized by the 
mean value over the same period). 
                                                 
5 The process involves using text extracts to match firm names as they appear on each database.  After the automated 
matching process, we inspect each paired observation for errors due to pathologies of the algorithm.  We thank 
Charles Himmelberg for providing a conversion table and helpful advice. 
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We obtain information on managerial compensation and ownership from the ExecuComp 
database.  Following Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (1999, 2002), we use the sensitivity of 
CEO’s stock and option values to changes in stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of CEO’s 
stock and option values to changes in stock return volatility (vega) as measures for incentives 
provided by managerial compensation and ownership.  Based on these measures, Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen (2006) find that higher vega leads to more risk-taking activities by management, 
such as lower investment in property, plant, and equipment, higher book leverage, and market 
leverage.  In contrast, higher delta leads to less risky financial policies such as a decrease in 
leverage and an increase in capital expenditures. 
We follow the procedure described by Core and Guay (2002) for constructing delta and 
vega, and we use these statistics as proxies for managerial incentives.  The CEO’s delta is 
obtained by weighting each CEO’s delta for shares owned and delta for options owned by the 
number of shares and options held by that CEO.   The delta for stock is 1 by definition, and the 
delta for stock option holdings is based on the derivative of the Black-Scholes formula with 
respect to stock price: 
 )(, zeDelta
dT
ioption F´=
-     (9) 
T
TdrKS
z
s
s )5.0()/log( 2´+-+
=    (10) 
where )(zF  is the cumulative probability distribution function for the normal distribution, S is 
the price of the underlying stock, K is the exercise (strike) price of the option, s  is expected 
stock-return volatility over the life of the option, r is the continuously compounded of risk-free 
interest rate, T is time to maturity of the option in years, and d is the continuously compounded 
expected dividend yield over the life of the option.  The strike price is estimated from the 
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difference between the year-end stock price and the CEO’s intrinsic (in-the-money) option 
values: 
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ii
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Where S  is the year-end stock price, iInMonEx  is the intrinsic value of unexercised vested 
options, iInMonUn  is the intrinsic value of unexercised unvested options, iUnexNumEx  is the 
number of vested options, and iUnexNumUn  is the number of unvested options; all these 
variables are disclosed for each CEO in firms’ proxy statements and reported in ExecuComp.  
When K cannot be estimated because all of the CEO’s options are out of the money with zero 
intrinsic value, we use certain alternative assumptions described by Core and Guay (2002).  To 
take account of the size of the CEO’s equity position relative to the total capitalization of the 
firm, we divide the delta of each CEO by the firm’s total shares outstanding plus the CEO’s 
options.  The approach, following the functional form used by Yermack’s (1995) study of delta 
incentives from CEO options, gives the value gain realized by each CEO for a $1.00 increase in 
the firm’s equity value. 
Since the vega for stock is very close to zero, we only need to evaluate vega for option 
holdings, which is provided by the derivative of the Black-Scholes formula with respect to 
volatility: 
TSzeVega dTioption ´´´=
- )(, f     (12) 
where z, S, T, and d are defined as above.  Due to the skewness of vega’s distribution, we 
generally use the functional form log(1+vega) in our regression estimations. 
To estimate each CEO’s delta and vega for option grants, we use a standard set of 
assumptions and data sources.  The year-end stock price S is obtained from ExecuComp.  The 
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annualized volatility s  is estimated as the standard deviation of daily logarithmic stock returns 
(from CRSP) over 252 trading days, multiplied by the square root of 252.  The remaining time to 
maturity t for the inventory of a CEO’s option grants is assumed to be 6 years, following Core 
and Guay (2002). The risk-free rate r is obtained from the zero-coupon U.S. Treasury strip with 
comparable maturity, as reported by Bloomberg.  The expected dividend rate d is estimated from 
Compustat data by dividing per-share dividends paid during the corresponding fiscal year by 
year-end stock price.  We match each PSD contract with the CEO’s prior year-end delta and 
vega for each issuing company. 
After discarding firms without adequate data availability, we have a sample of 1,375 PSD 
contracts for 461 firms.  Together with 3,918 non-PSD contracts for 1,148 firms, our whole 
sample consists of 5,293 contracts for 1,239 firms who compete in 57 different primary two-digit 
SIC industries.  Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
CEOs’ equity incentives appear significantly different between firms issuing PSD and 
those issuing ordinary debt contracts.  The mean CEO delta is 0.023 for the PSD loan sample 
while that of the non-PSD loan sample is 0.029, significantly different at the 1 percent level.  The 
vega, in contrast, is larger for the PSD sample than the non-PSD sample, with the difference 
again significant at the 1 percent level. 
Since the firms in our sample are public companies with bank relationships, they tend to 
be large.  The median market capitalization for the PSD sample is $3.2 billion while that of the 
non-PSD sample is $1.9 billion.  The median value of total assets is $4.3 billion for firms with 
PSD contracts and is $2.7 billion for firms without PSD contracts, which is substantially larger 
than the average for the entire Compustat population.  Firms with PSD contracts have lower 
market-to-book ratios and cash flow (EBITDA) than those without PSD contracts.  PSD 
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borrowers are somewhat older than straight debt borrowers.  Figure 3 shows that both PSD and 
non-PSD issuers in our sample generally have high credit quality, but the distribution is 
somewhat tighter for PSD, with straight debt accounting for most of the observations with very 
high and very low ratings.6  We do not find noticeable industry differences in our samples of 
PSD and non-PSD contracts.  Table 2 presents the five highest and lowest industries for PSD use, 
ranked according to the ratio of PSD contracts over all debt contracts in our sample.  Industries 
are arranged according to the 48 Fama-French SIC groups. 
Loan characteristics of PSD contracts and ordinary debt contracts also exhibit noticeable 
differences.  Loan amounts of PSD contracts are larger than those of the ordinary debt contracts.  
The numbers of lenders involved in PSD contracts are significantly larger than those involved in 
ordinary debt contracts.  This is consistent with Asquith et al. (2005), who find that performance 
pricing is used to reduce renegotiation costs, which can become prohibitively high when many 
lenders are involved.  PSD contracts have shorter maturity than ordinary debt contracts. 
Our summary statistics for the average slope and local slope of PSD contracts indicate 
mean values of approximately 0.28 and 0.32, respectively.  Our measure of overall convexity 
exhibits mean and median values just below 0.20, indicating that pricing schedules tend to be 
bowed toward the origin at a maximal deviation of about 20 percent below the linear projection 
between a schedule’s endpoints.  However, most PSD contracts exhibit very little convexity near 
the debt rating at the time of contract inception, as the mean value for local convexity is just 0.03 
and the median value for local convexity is zero. 
                                                 
6 A certain number of observations are non-rated in both the PSD and non-PSD samples and are not used in Figure 3.  
It is possible for a non-rated bond to have a PSD pricing schedule based upon its credit rating, and this happens 72 
times on our sample.  In these cases the loan contract generally treats non-rated status as equivalent to having the 
lowest possible credit rating. 
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In Table 3 we show the sample correlations between average slope, local slope, overall 
convexity, local convexity, and a fifth variable equal to the number of individual rating steps 
specified in each PSD contract.  These five quantities are used as dependent variables in our 
regression analysis below.  We show correlations both for the entire sample, including fixed-rate 
debt with no pricing schedule, and for the subsample of PSD contracts only.  We see very strong 
correlations among most of the dependent variables within the overall sample, due to the 
majority of zero-valued observations for all four of them.  Within the subsample of PSD 
contracts, sample correlations have much more modest magnitudes, the largest being the 
correlation of 0.545 between average slope and local slope.  The two convexity measures exhibit 
weakly negative correlations with both average slope and local slope. 
Figure 4 provides some preliminary evidence that CEO incentives play an important role 
in the decision to issue PSD instead of straight debt.  The figure shows PSD issuance frequencies 
for a subsample of 248 CEOs who receive very large stock option awards, which we define as 
more than 1% of the company’s shares outstanding.  We display the probability that the firm’s 
next debt issue following a large CEO option award is PSD, with the data shown separately 
depending upon whether the last debt issue prior to the option award was PSD or straight debt.  
For comparison purposes, data are also shown in the same format for our remaining sample of 
4,450 pairs of debt contracts issued in sequence by individual firms, with no large CEO stock 
option award occurring between each contract pair.  The figure shows that while prior PSD 
issuers continue to exhibit a preference for PSD in their next debt contracts, a large CEO option 
award leads to a markedly greater likelihood of PSD issuance regardless of the characteristics of 
the prior issue.  Among the group of prior straight debt issuers, for instance, the probability that 
the next debt issue is PSD is about 40 percent following the receipt of a large option award by 
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the CEO, and about 25 percent otherwise.  The difference is somewhat less dramatic for prior 
PSD issuers but is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in both cases. 
 
4. Analysis of PSD contract terms 
In this section, we examine the impact of CEO’s equity incentives on firms' choice of 
PSD contract parameters.  As described in the previous section, we expect CEOs with high 
values of vega to prefer more risky PSD contracts, and CEOs with high values of delta to prefer 
less risky contracts. 
 
4.1. Slope 
We begin by using the slope of the PSD performance pricing schedule as our measure of 
the risk of a PSD contract.  Because the straight-debt contracts in our sample exhibit zero slope 
by definition, we employ a Tobit regression specification: 
Slope Slopei i= max( , )
* 0  
Slope Delta Vega Xi Industry Year i i i i
* = + + + × + × + × +a a a b b g e1 2    (13) 
e si N~ ( , )0
2  
iSlope  is the dependent variable (the slope of PSD contract), Delta i  is the delta of CEO’s equity 
grants normalized by shares outstanding, Vegai  is the vega of CEO’s equity grants specified as 
log(1+vega), X i  are control variables, a Industry  are two-digit SIC dummy variables, aYear  are 
year dummy variables, and ei  is the error term.  We draw independent variables from prior 
literature on CEO compensation (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999) and on capital structure (e.g., 
Barclay and Smith, 1995) to control for heterogeneity in borrowers’ characteristics and loan 
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characteristics.  These control variables in our models include firm size, leverage, market-to-
book ratio, return on assets (based upon EBITDA), the time series volatility of EBITDA (the 
standard deviation over the prior four years, scaled by the mean over the prior four years), and an 
indicator variable for whether the firm’s senior debt is rated by either Moody’s or Standard & 
Poor’s.  In order to control for heterogeneity in loan characteristics, we use loan amount (scaled 
by total assets) and the log of maturity, as well as the log of the total number of PSD contracts 
for each firm reported in Dealscan, whether or not these contracts meet the data criteria for 
inclusion on our sample.  These control variables account for differences in borrowing capacity, 
investment opportunities and activities, uncertainty in borrowers' performance, and basic loan 
conditions.  In order to account for the clustering of PSD contracts within firms and the 
heteroskedasticity of the error terms (e), we cluster all standard errors at the firm level. 
 Endogeneity of the main delta and vega explanatory variables poses a potential problem 
for our estimation framework.  It is possible that a CEO’s incentive structure and aspects of the 
firm’s capital structure are determined simultaneously by many of the same economic forces.  To 
deal with this possibility, we estimate our models in a two stage least squares Tobit framework.  
A 2SLS Tobit model in which more than one explanatory variable may be endogenous is 
provided by Blundell and Smith (1986).  The model is: 
1332211
*
1 ' eggb ++++= Lyyxy  (Tobit),    (14) 
2222 ' ep += xy , 
3333 ' ep += xy , 
and so on. 
 
The authors show that under the null hypothesis of no simultaneity, the following procedure is 
asymptotically equivalent to a score, or Lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity, i.e., 
Cov[ jee ,1 ] = 0, j=2,…: 
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Step 1.  Use OLS to regress jy  on jx  for j = 2,… (the regression equations) and keep the 
resuduals (as vj, say) 
 
Step 2.  Estimate the Tobit model as specified above by maximum likelihood, but include 
the residual vectors from equations 2, 3, . . . , as additional right hand side variables. 
 
Step 3.  To determine the presence of endogeneity, test the joint hypotheses that the 
slopes on the residuals equal zero. 
For nearly all of our models, Wald tests indicate that the null hypothesis of exogeneity for 
delta and vega is rejected, so we adopt the 2SLS approach in our regressions throughout the 
paper.  To implement this model, we need separate independent variables for the first-stage OLS 
models of CEOs’ delta and vega incentives. We estimate the delta model with the dependent 
variables equal to the log of cash compensation (salary plus bonus), earnings 1 year growth, 
return to shareholders, the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick governance index, firm size (log of total 
assets), years tenure as CEO, year dummy variables, and two-digit industry dummy variables.  
For the vega model the independent variables are the log of cash compensation, earnings 1 year 
growth, return to shareholders, the governance index, the market-to-book ratio, and two-digit 
industry dummies.  Data availability limitations for the first stage force us to cut our sample from 
5,293 to 4,451 observations in order to estimate the 2SLS model. 
As a measure for the goodness of the fit of the Tobit model, we adopt the following: 
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where iyˆ  is the value predicted by a maximum likelihood estimation, iy  is the actual value 
observed in the data, and y  is the sample mean.7 
                                                 
7 In nonlinear regression, there is no well behaved counterpart to the R2 from linear regression.  One of the 
shortcomings of the above fit measure is that it does not relate to the proportion of variation explained; it only 
ranges from zero to one because of a mechanical normalization.  For further discussion on fit measures for nonlinear 
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 Table 4 shows parameter estimates for our 2SLS Tobit model given in Equation (14) with 
the dependent variables equal to the average and local slopes of the performance pricing function.  
As shown in the table, we find that a CEO’s delta has a negative impact on firms’ choices of 
PSD slopes (significant for average slope but not local slope), whereas vega has significantly 
positive impact that is similar for both dependent variables.  These estimates are consistent with 
our moral hazard hypothesis that CEOs with high delta prefer flatter PSD contracts to mitigate 
the expected costs of financial distress, while CEOs with high vega prefer steeper PSD contracts 
because they increase the riskiness of the firm and volatility of stock returns. 
To assess the economic significance of the estimated coefficients for the CEO delta and 
vega variables, we evaluate the impact of a one standard deviation change in each variable upon 
the average slope.  Based on the descriptive statistics from Table 1, a one standard deviation 
increase in the CEO’s delta, which is 0.048, corresponds to a decrease of 0.105 in the average 
slope of the pricing schedule, according to estimates in the left column of Table 4.  Compared to 
the median value of 0.254, this change implies a reduction in magnitude of about 42 percent.  For 
the log(1+vega) variable, a one standard deviation change in the vega variable implies a change 
in the PSD slope of about 17 percent.  All of these results about the importance of delta and vega 
are robust to various combinations of subsets of control variables specified in Equation (13), as 
well as to tests on delta and vega alone by themselves without the other. 
 Analyzing estimates for other control variables in Table 4, we see that firms with smaller 
size, lower leverage, and higher cash flow (EBITDA) choose steeper PSD contracts.  These 
results are broadly consistent with certain theories in corporate finance about optimizing 
behavior of the borrowers and lenders.  For example, firms with high leverage may negotiate less 
                                                                                                                                                             
regressions, we refer the reader to the modeling guide of LIMDEP software, which we use for the estimation of our 
Tobit model (Greene, 2002). 
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risky PSD contracts to reduce agency costs of debt related to asset substitution.  Firms with 
higher cash flow likely face lower expected costs of financial distress and therefore bear fewer 
implicit costs from steeper-sloped PSD contracts.   
 
4.2. Interest increasing and interest decreasing slope segments 
 Our results in Table 4 indicate a connection between the slope of PSD contracts and the 
structure of CEOs’ equity incentives.  To understand this link in greater detail, we investigate the 
PSD slope in both directions starting from the firm’s credit rating at the time of contract 
inception.  If a firm’s credit quality worsens, it moves into the “interest increasing” range of the 
PSD pricing schedule and must pay greater coupon rates.  In the other direction, if credit quality 
improves the firm may move into the “interest decreasing” PSD range and pay lower rates.  In 
our sample of 1,375 PSD contracts, approximately 14 percent are strictly interest increasing, 
specifying rate changes only in the direction of credit deterioration, and another 6 percent are 
strictly interest decreasing.  However, the overwhelming majority of 80 percent of contracts 
exhibit both interest increasing and interest decreasing slope components.  In Table 5, we present 
regression results in which the dependent variable equals the slope of each of these pieces; for 
example, for the interest increasing contracts the dependent variable equals the actual PSD slope 
at all credit ratings below the current rating, and zero at all ratings above it. 
 Estimates in Table 5 indicate that the relation between managers’ delta and the PSD slope 
is negative over both the interest increasing and interest decreasing segments, but the magnitude 
is far stronger for the interest increasing segment and is only significant in this direction.  We 
conclude that delta incentives cause managers to have greater concern over avoiding the costs of 
financial distress than with the possibility of reducing the firm’s credit costs in times of good 
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performance.  This pattern recalls the “asymmetric benchmarking” of CEO compensation 
incentives documented by Garvey and Milbourn (2006).  CEOs’ vega incentives are estimated as 
positive in both directions but without statistical significance. 
 
4.3.  Convexity 
 Having identified significant relations between PSD contract slopes and CEO incentives, 
we examine whether similar patterns exist for the convexity of PSD contracts.  Convexity 
provides an alternative measure of PSD contract riskiness, since convex pricing schedules 
accelerate the rate of increase interest payments and thereby accelerate the rate of financial 
burden as the firm approaches states of low cash flow.  Such convexity will increase the 
likelihood of financial distress, but it will also benefit CEOs with option-based risk incentives by 
providing very large rewards for improvements in firm performance.  Following similar 
arguments used in the previous section, we expect CEOs with high delta to prefer flat PSD 
contracts that avoid deterioration of firm value due to increased expected bankruptcy costs, while 
high vega CEOs should prefer riskier PSD contracts with convex performance pricing schedules. 
 We estimate least squares regressions to test associations between convexity and CEO 
incentive variables; the least squares framework is used instead of Tobit since a minority of PSD 
contracts – those with concave schedules – are treated as having negative values for convexity.  
As dependent variables, we use both overall and local measures of convexity; these are estimated 
over the entire contract performance range and the rating segments immediately adjacent to the 
rating at contract inception, respectively. 
Results of the estimation appear in Table 6.  Similar to our earlier findings about PSD 
slopes, we find significantly negative parameter estimates for the CEO delta variable in both 
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models and significant positive estimates for vega in one out of two.  These results buttress our 
earlier evidence that managers with risk-taking incentives arising from option holdings use PSD 
contracts as a risk-shifting device, while managers with high ownership incentives from shares 
and options tend to do the opposite. 
 
4.4. Gradation of PSD pricing schedules 
PSD contracts are specified in step-function form, and these contracts exhibit a large 
variation in the number of pricing steps, ranging from 1 to 20.  One possible explanation for this 
variation is lenders' desire to use finely-tuned pricing grids as substitutes for direct monitoring of 
management when moral hazard risks are high; i.e., lenders prefer to set fine pricing grids for 
those borrowers that are likely to experience frequent changes in performance that would 
otherwise require a high degree of outside monitoring.8  In relation to the managerial ownership 
variables introduced earlier, we expect CEOs with high vega incentives to fall into this group.  
We therefore re-estimate our Tobit regressions models with the dependent variable equal to the 
number of steps in the performance pricing schedule of each PSD contract, and equal to zero for 
straight debt contracts.  Parameter estimates are shown in Table 7.  Consistent with our 
hypothesis about refined pricing grids serving as substitutes for direct monitoring of management, 
we find that firms with high-delta CEO equity grants have smaller numbers of pricing steps 
while firms with high-vega CEO equity grants have a greater numbers. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
                                                 
8 Since the PSD contracts in our sample use the Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s credit rating as the performance 
measure, our hypothesis requires a conjecture that the rating agency can monitor the borrower firm more accurately, 
or at least more cost effectively, than the lender can. 
 25
This paper explores the effect of CEO equity incentives on the structure of performance 
sensitive debt contracts.  PSD contracts require larger interest payments during a downturn in a 
borrower's performance but lower interest during states of performance improvement.  This 
pattern tends to increase firm risk and lower overall equity value by exacerbating the expected 
costs of financial distress.  However, option holders would generally benefit from PSD contracts, 
since that pattern of payoffs to an optionee has a convex relation to overall equity value. 
We estimate relations between a large sample of PSD schedules and the structure of 
CEOs’ delta and vega incentives from their personal holdings of shares and options.  We find 
that CEOs with high vega incentives from their option holdings tend to choose steeper and more 
convex performance pricing schedules than those with low vegas.  These effects accord with our 
hypotheses about how the risk-taking incentives from personal option holdings should influence 
managers’ choices when negotiating PSD schedules.  Moreover, we find the opposite result for 
CEOs with high delta incentives, suggesting that they negotiate flatter and less steep PSD 
contracts in order to reduce the expected costs of financial distress.  We also find evidence that 
PSD schedules exhibit more detailed refinement, with more individual steps appearing in the 
pricing grid under conditions in which lenders’ incentives to monitor CEOs should be especially 
strong. 
 
Appendix: Examples of PSD Contracts 
Table A1 shows three loans from Nortel Networks Inc., illustrating how typical PSD 
contracts are described in performance pricing grids.  These loans were 364-day facilities 
borrowed from syndicates of banks during 2001 and 2002, a period during which the company’s 
credit rating was in decline.  On July 31, 2001, Nortel‘s S&P senior debt rating was A, which 
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subsequently fell to BBB- on December 20, 2001, and then to “not-rated” on April 8, 2002.  The 
loan amounts ranged from $660 million to $1.22 billion. 
Performance grids for the three loan contracts appear at the bottom of Table A1 and in 
Figure A1.  Performance spreads are measured in basis points over LIBOR and are contingent 
upon the borrower’s credit rating.  The first contract specified future credit rating contingencies 
below the borrower’s current credit rating, while the last contract specified future credit rating 
contingencies higher than current borrower’s credit rating.  The former is called an interest-
increasing PSD contract, and the latter is referred as an interest-decreasing PSD contract.  The 
performance grid of the first contract, when Nortel Networks Inc. was A-rated, ranged from A to 
BBB-, while the performance grids when Nortel Networks Inc. was BBB- or NR rated ranged 
from BBB+ to BB.  Thus, the performance grids specified detailed pricing schedules near a 
borrower’s current credit rating, while leaving ranges far from the current rating as a flat 
schedule.  Finally, the number of pricing steps was smaller when Nortel had high credit quality 
(A rated) compared to when it had poor credit quality (BBB- and NR). 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics for a sample of performance sensitive debt (PSD) and regular debt contracts.  Data are drawn for observations representing 
the intersection of the Dealscan, Compustat, and ExecuComp databases between 1994 and 2002, from all industries except financial industry (SIC 
6000-6999).  The PSD sample includes only contracts for which the performance measure is based exclusively upon the company’s senior debt 
rating.  The delta and vega variables for each company’s CEO are based upon holdings of stock and options.  Leverage equals total debt / total 
assets.  Volatility of sales is the time series standard deviation of annual sales over the four years prior to the loan year, divided by the time series 
mean value.  The slope and convexity of the PSD loan pricing schedules are based upon changes in the interest spread for different rating intervals, 
as described more completely in the text.  The PSD sample includes 1,375 contracts negotia ted by 461 individual firms, while the non-PSD 
contract includes 3,918 contracts from 1,148 firms. 
 
 PSD contracts  Non-PSD contracts  Difference in means 
CEO incentives Median Mean Std. Dev.  Median Mean Std. Dev.  Difference t-statistic 
Delta 0.0070 0.0230 0.0480  0.0095 0.0295 0.0575  (0.0065) -3.77 
log(1+Vega) 15.9 14.5 4.7  15.3 13.7 5.2  0.8 5.20 
Cash compensation (000) $1,260 $1,587 $1,181  $992 $1,402 $1,508  $184 4.11 
Years tenure in office 5 7.6 7.4  5 7.3 7.0  0.3 1.26 
           Borrower characteristics           
Market capitalization (mm) $3,196 $7,665 $13,862  $1,936 $10,979 $34,311  ($3,314) -3.48 
Firm age (years) 30 32.0 21.4  25 29.5 22.9  2.5 3.60 
Total assets (mm) $4,297 $9,257 $15,485  $2,657 $11,236 $38,333  ($1,979) -1.86 
Leverage  0.33 0.33 0.14  0.32 0.33 0.21  0.01 1.20 
Market-to-book ratio 1.40 1.68 0.93  1.40 1.85 1.85  (0.17) -3.21 
PP&E (mm) $1,438 $3,476 $5,059  $841 $3,437 $6,973  $38 0.19 
Cash flow (EBITDA, mm) $559 $1,046 $1,695  $314 $1,237 $3,140  ($191) -2.14 
Volatility of cash flow 0.317 0.503 2.018  0.328 0.529 10.143  (0.026) -0.10 
Senior debt rating at loan date BBB+    BB+      
           Loan characteristics           
Amount (mm) $400 $705 $917  $196 $433 $814  $272 10.32 
Maturity (months) 36 36.8 23.2  36 43.1 40.6  (6.3) -5.42 
Number of lenders 14 16.4 11.5  5 8.2 9.6  8.2 25.87 
Steps in pricing schedule 5 5.1 1.1        
Average slope 0.254 0.284 0.156        
Local slope 0.281 0.316 0.244        
Overall convexity 0.198 0.189 0.177        
Local convexity 0.000 0.030 0.242        
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Table 2 
PSD issuance frequency by industry: highest and lowest 
Performance sensitive debt issuance frequency in various industries, according to observations from the 
Dealscan database between 1994 and 2002, from all industries except financial industry (SIC 6000-6999).  
The table shows the fraction of PSD contracts in the five industries with the highest and lowest PSD 
frequencies, as well as the frequency for the overall sample.  Industries are sorted into 48 groups 
according to the Fama-French SIC code mapping.  Industries with fewer than 50 observations are not 
shown in the table. 
 
Industry 
 
Debt contracts in sample  
 
PSD frequency 
Printing and publishing 88 44.3% 
Construction materials 101 41.6% 
Apparel 108 38.0% 
Consumer goods 99 35.4% 
Chemicals 253 35.2% 
. . .   
ENTIRE SAMPLE 5,293 26.0% 
. . .   
Automobiles and trucks 137 16.8% 
Restaurants and lodging 90 13.3% 
Health care 86 12.8% 
Pharmaceuticals 113 9.7% 
Computer equipment 144 7.6% 
 32
Table 3 
Correlations among dependent variables 
Sample correlations among key dependent variables.  The top panel shows Pearson correlations for the 
entire sample of 5,293 debt contracts, and the bottom panel shows correlations for the subsample of 1,375 
performance sensitive debt (PSD) contracts.  Data are drawn from the intersection of observations in the 
Dealscan, Compustat, and ExecuComp databases between 1994 and 2002, from all industries except 
financial industry (SIC 6000-6999).   The slope and convexity of the PSD loan pricing schedules are 
based upon changes in interest spreads for different rating intervals, as described more completely in the 
text.  The number of steps is a count variable equal to the number of individual changes in interest rates 
specified by PSD contracts, which generally are written in a step-function form.  
 
All observations 
 
Average slope 
 
Local slope 
 
Overall convexity 
 
Local convexity 
Local slope 0.823***    
Overall convexity 0.505*** 0.498***   
Local convexity 0.092*** -0.006 0.208***  
Number of steps 0.804*** 0.701*** 0.688*** 0.117*** 
 
 
PSD observations 
 
Average slope 
 
Local slope 
 
Overall convexity 
 
Local convexity 
Local slope 0.545***    
Overall convexity -0.168*** -0.011   
Local convexity 0.004 -0.127*** 0.186***  
Number of steps -0.003 -0.043* 0.190*** 0.052* 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
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Table 4 
Average and local slopes of PSD contracts 
Regression estimates of the average slope and local slope of the pricing schedules of performance 
sensitive debt contracts.  The sample includes 5,293 debt contracts issued by 1,239 firms between 1994 
and 2002, both with and without PSD contract features.  The average slope of the pricing schedule equals 
the mean of the ratio of the differential interest cost over each credit rating interval covered by a PSD 
contract, divided by the differential Moody’s value weighted average interest cost over the same interval 
at the time of contract negotiation.  Local slope is the average slope measured over the two rating 
intervals immediately adjacent to the firm’s rating; if performance pricing is defined only in one direction, 
local slope is calculated only for the single adjacent interval.  For non-PSD (straight) debt, the majority of 
the sample, this slope equals zero by construction.  Key explanatory variables are the sensitivity of CEO 
stock and option values to stock price (delta), and the sensitivity of CEO option values to stock price 
volatility (vega).  Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. Estimates use a two 
stage least squares Tobit framework described more fully in the text. 
 
Dependent variable: Average slope x 102 Local slope x 102 
Delta -219.816 -164.320 
 (85.632)** (125.568) 
Log (1+vega) 0.936 1.114 
 (0.549)* (0.691)* 
Firm size (log of assets) -3.906 -4.141 
 (1.170)*** (1.502)*** 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) -33.362 -46.653 
 (7.165)*** (10.022)*** 
Market-to-book ratio -0.687 0.165 
 (0.867) (1.120) 
EBITDA / total assets 27.011 30.485 
 (10.386)*** (13.031)** 
EBITDA time series volatility -0.022 -0.019 
 (0.071) (0.094) 
Sr. debt rated by S&P or Moody’s (indicator) 31.955 39.781 
 (3.285)*** (4.585)*** 
Loan amount / total assets  0.190 0.353 
 (0.979) (1.347) 
Log of Maturity (months) 0.265 0.480 
 (0.956) (1.212) 
Log of Number of PSD contracts / firm 38.663 47.043 
 (1.777)*** (2.803)*** 
   
Year & 2-digit SIC indicators Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.445 0.461 
Observations 4,451 4,451 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 5 
Interest increasing and interest decreasing slope segments of PSD contracts 
Regression estimates of the average slope of the pricing schedules of performance sensitive debt contracts.  
The sample includes 5,293 debt contracts issued by 1,239 firms between 1994 and 2002, both with and 
without PSD contract features.  The average slope dependent variable, which is defined more completely 
in the text, is decomposed into two segments.  In the first column, the dependent variable equals the 
average slope at all credit ratings below the firm’s rating at the time of contract inception (the “interest 
increasing” range), and zero at all higher ratings.  In the right column, the dependent variable equals the 
average slope at all credit ratings above the firm’s current rating (the “interest decreasing” range) and zero 
otherwise. For non-PSD (straight) debt, both dependent variables always equal zero.  Key explanatory 
variables are the sensitivity of CEO stock and option values to stock price (delta), and the sensitivity of 
CEO option values to stock price volatility (vega).  Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown 
in parentheses.  Estimates use a two stage least squares Tobit framework described more fully in the text. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Slope of interest increasing 
segment x 102 
Slope of interest decreasing 
segment x 102 
Delta -232.110 -79.546 
 (79.955)*** (83.629) 
Log (1+vega) 0.769 0.381 
 (0.500) (0.529) 
Firm size (log of assets) -4.676 -2.730 
 (1.097)*** (1.107)** 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) -36.729 -27.243 
 (7.151)*** (6.950)*** 
Market-to-book ratio -0.146 -1.961 
 (0.839) (0.965)** 
EBITDA / total assets 25.574 26.061 
 (10.212)** (9.270)*** 
EBITDA time series volatility -0.002 -0.023 
 (0.055) (0.065) 
Sr. debt rated by S&P or Moody’s (indicator) 172.002 22.627 
 (9.377)*** (3.225)*** 
Loan amount / total assets  -0.009 -0.085 
 (0.824) (0.769) 
Log of Maturity (months) 0.222 0.397 
 (0.900) (0.894) 
Log of Number of PSD contracts / firm 34.763 31.428 
 (1.724)*** (2.064)*** 
   
Year & 2-digit SIC indicators Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.479 0.470 
Observations 4,451 4,451 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 6 
Global and local convexity of PSD contracts 
Two-stage least squares regression estimates of the global and local convexity of pricing schedules of 
performance sensitive debt contracts.  The sample includes 5,293 debt contracts issued by 1,239 firms 
between 1994 and 2002, both with and without PSD contract features.  Convexity is calculated based 
upon the most extreme departure of the pricing schedule slope from the linear projection of the schedule 
between the upper and lower limits of credit ratings for which performance pricing is contracted.  
Concave pricing schedules, about eight percent of the sample, are assigned negative values for convexity.  
Global convexity is measured over the entire range of credit ratings for which performance pricing is 
specified, while local convexity is measured over the two rating intervals immediately adjacent to the 
firm’s rating; if performance pricing is defined only in one direction, local convexity is calculated only 
for the single adjacent interval.  For non-PSD (straight) debt, the majority of the sample, convexity 
always equals zero by construction.  Key explanatory variables are the sensitivity of CEO stock and 
option values to stock price (delta), and the sensitivity of CEO option values to stock price volatility 
(vega).  Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Global convexity x 102 Local convexity x 102 
Delta -43.078 -59.480 
 (22.991)* (25.713)** 
Log (1+vega) 0.267 0.060 
 (0.144)* (0.151) 
Firm size (log of assets) -0.606 -0.096 
 (0.336)* (0.390) 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) -7.731 -3.626 
 (1.435)*** (1.484)** 
Market-to-book ratio 0.350 0.078 
 (0.162)** (0.188) 
EBITDA / total assets -1.505 0.812 
 (1.416) (1.146) 
EBITDA time series volatility -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Sr. debt rated by S&P or Moody’s (indicator) 3.428 1.349 
 (0.577)*** (0.637)** 
Loan amount / total assets  0.161 0.110 
 (0.317) (0.190) 
Log of Maturity (months) 0.442 0.205 
 (0.242)* (0.236) 
Log of Number of PSD contracts / firm 6.342 6.188 
 (0.540)*** (0.770)*** 
   
Year & 2-digit SIC indicators Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.144 
Observations 4,451 4,451 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 7 
Number of gradations in PSD contract schedules 
Regression estimate of the number of individual steps in the pricing schedules of performance sensitive 
debt contracts.  The sample includes 5,293 debt contracts issued by 1,239 firms between 1994 and 2002, 
both with and without PSD contract features.  PSD contracts are typically specified in step-function form, 
with interest rates increasing if the firm’s credit rating is revised downward.  The dependent variable 
counts the number of these revisions over the entire range of credit ratings specified in each contract.  For 
non-PSD (straight) debt, the majority of the sample, the dependent variable always equals zero.  Key 
explanatory variables are the sensitivity of CEO stock and option values to stock price (delta), and the 
sensitivity of CEO option values to stock price volatility (vega).  Standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are shown in parentheses.  Estimates use a two stage least squares Tobit framework described more 
fully in the text. 
 
Dependent variable: Number of steps in performance pricing schedule 
Delta -27.375 
 (11.530)** 
Log (1+vega) 0.141 
 (0.072)** 
Residual of Delta 26.077 
 (11.550)** 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) -5.250 
 (0.963)*** 
Market-to-book ratio -0.064 
 (0.120) 
EBITDA / total assets 3.430 
 (1.490)** 
EBITDA time series volatility -0.001 
 (0.009) 
Sr. debt rated by S&P or Moody’s (indicator) 4.336 
 (0.409)*** 
Loan amount / total assets  0.042 
 (0.131) 
Log of maturity (months) 0.100 
 (0.122) 
Log of Number of PSD contracts / firm 4.958 
 (0.175)*** 
  
Year & 2-digit SIC indicators Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.440 
Observations 4,451 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table A1 
Examples of performance pricing grids  
Data for Nortel Networks Inc.'s syndicated 364-day facilities issued on July 31, 2001, December 20, 2001, 
and April 8, 2002, as reported by Dealscan.  Each loan’s pricing was tied to Nortel’s long-term senior 
unsecured rating by Standard & Poor’s.  At the time of contracting, Nortel's S&P senior debt rating was A 
on July 31, 2001, BBB- on December 20, 2001, and not rated on April 8, 2002.  The performance grids 
show spreads measured by basis points over LIBOR, contingent upon the company’s S&P rating. 
 
Loan characteristics Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 
Date July 31, 2001 December 20, 2001 April 8, 2002 
Type 364-day facility 364-day facility 364-day facility 
Amount $1,220 million $660 million $1,175 million 
Lenders in syndicate 10 11 25 
Lead bank 
Chase Manhattan  
& Credit Suisse 
JPMorgan Chase 
& Credit Suisse JP Morgan Chase 
Senior Yes Yes Yes 
Secured No Yes N/A 
Covenant (million) 
$3,500 
(Net worth) 
$1,880 
(Tangible net worth) N/A 
Company’s S&P senior debt rating A BBB- NR 
    
Performance grid (basis points over LIBOR) 
Greater than A 45 - - 
Greater than A- 55 - - 
Greater than BBB+ 77.5 77.5 77.5 
Greater than BBB 100 100 100 
Greater than BBB- 120 120 120 
Greater than BB+ - 150 150 
Greater than BB - 162.5 162.5 
Less than BB - 175 175 
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Figure 1 
Performance pricing profiles 
Profile r is a typical performance pricing profile for the performance sensitive debt contracts in our 
sample.  Profile r* is the pricing schedule that maximizes the value of an executive stock option that has 
exercise price ( )0( ) (1 ) /K v A r D N= - + , where v(A) is the value of the firm corresponding to credit rating A, 
N is the number of shares outstanding, r0 is the interest rate on debt with the highest possible credit rating, 
and D is face value of debt issued by the firm.  As drawn, the tradeoff between lower interest rates in 
good credit rating states and higher interest rates in poor credit rating states is more pronounced for 
profile r*. 
 r0 
   B  BB  BBB    A  AA  AAA 
Credit rating 
r* 
r  r(B) 
r*(B) 
Interest rate
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Figure 2 
Slope and convexity of a performance pricing profile  
The figure shows a hypothetical performance pricing profile for a firm that has credit rating i and 
negotiates a performance sensitive debt contract calling for higher interest payments if the credit rating 
deteriorates and lower interest payments if it improves.  The figure shows how the interest rate might 
change above and below the firm’s current rating.  If i – 1 and i + 1 represent the credit ratings 
immediately adjacent to current rating, then our definition of local slope is: 
 
 
 
 
Where Spread(n) is the interest charged at credit rating n, measured as basis points above LIBOR, and 
Moody(n) is the value-weighted average yield for long-term corporate bonds of credit rating n during the 
month in which the contract is negotiated.  Our definition of average slope is analogous, except it is 
measured using the mean ratios for all rating segments between the upper and lower limits of credit 
ratings specified in each contract.  Our definition of overall convexity, which is described more fully in 
the text, is based upon the maximum deviation of a pricing profile from linearity and is therefore similar 
to the ratio: 
 
 
 
 
Convexity therefore equals zero for perfectly linear pricing schedules and takes a negative value for 
concave schedules. 
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Figure 3 
Credit quality of PSD and straight debt issuers  
The figure shows the frequency distribution of senior debt ratings at the time of contract 
inception for samples of 1,303 performance sensitive debt contracts and 2,666 straight debt 
contracts.  The PSD and straight debt samples analyzed in the paper are somewhat larger, but the 
figure does not include debt issues by companies that are not rated by S&P or Moody’s. 
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Figure 4 
PSD issuance frequencies and large CEO stock option awards  
The figure shows performance sensitive debt issuance frequencies for subsamples partitioned according to 
whether the company’s prior debt issue in the Dealscan database was PSD or straight debt.  Within each 
subsample, PSD frequencies are shown separately based upon whether the CEO received a large stock 
option award between the prior and subsequent debt issues, with a large option award defined as greater 
than 1.0% of shares outstanding.  The overall sample includes 248 observations associated with large 
CEO option awards, and 4,450 observations with no large awards.  In both subsamples, the difference 
between the two bars shown is statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Figure A1 
Examples of performance pricing grids  
The figure shows examples of pricing grids in performance sensitive debt contracts negotiated by Nortel 
Networks Inc., according to data from Loan Pricing Corp.’s Dealscan database.  The solid blue line shows 
interest rates for a 364-day credit facility negotiated on July 31, 2001, contingent upon the company’s 
future credit rating.  The dashed green line shows the pricing schedule for similar loans to the same 
company on December 20, 2001, and April 8, 2002.  Nortel’s S&P senior debt rating was A on July 31, 
2001, BBB- on December 20, 2001, and NR on April 8, 2002. 
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